Bill brief/S2657/119th Congress
Chinese and Russian military suppliers could face U.S. sanctions
Official title
STOP China and Russia Act of 2025
S.2657 would require U.S. sanctions on certain Chinese and Russian people and entities involved in mutual military support between the two countries. It targets trade in specified military‑related goods, weapons, and training linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine and possible operations in the Taiwan Strait. It also orders a strategy with U.S. allies to coordinate sanctions and export controls.
Bill
S2657
Introduced
Aug 1, 2025
Sponsor
Sponsor not listed
Chamber
Senate
What the bill does
What this bill does
This bill orders the U. S. President to impose sanctions on certain foreign people and organizations tied to the governments of China or Russia. These targets include Chinese or Russian persons, or entities they control, that knowingly provide key goods, services, weapons, or training to help Russia’s military or defense industry, or that help China’s military prepare for operations in the Taiwan Strait. The goods listed include items like computer‑controlled machine tools, chemical materials used in munitions, certain fiber‑optic cables with military uses, and advanced sensors.
The required sanctions have two main parts. First, the U. S. government must block and freeze any property and interests in property of these sanctioned persons that are in the United States or under the control of U. S. persons. Second, affected foreign individuals become ineligible for U. S. visas, admission, or parole, and any existing visas must be revoked. The bill allows the President to issue regulations, licenses, and orders to carry out these sanctions and applies existing civil and criminal penalties for violations. The bill includes several limits and flexibilities. It exempts U. S.
intelligence and law‑enforcement activities and entries needed to meet U. S. obligations to the United Nations and under consular treaties. It also states that these sanctions tools may not be used to block the import of goods into the United States. The President may waive sanctions on a specific person for up to 90 days at a time if doing so is judged to be in the national interest and reported to Congress. Sanctions on a given person can be terminated if the person stops the sanctioned activity and provides reliable assurances it will not resume.
The entire sanctions section and any sanctions imposed under it automatically end 7 years after enactment. Separately, the bill requires the Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to Congress a strategy within 30 days to work with allies and partners. This strategy must explain how the United States will coordinate diplomatic efforts, sanctions, export controls, and work with foreign governments and private financial actors.
The goal is to jointly deter and reduce China’s support for Russia’s defense base and Russia’s support for China’s capabilities for possible operations in the Taiwan Strait. Follow‑up progress reports are required every 90 days, in unclassified form with an optional classified annex.
Key provisions
- The President must start imposing sanctions 90 days after the bill becomes law. The targets are certain Chinese and Russian people, entities, and groups they control that take part in covered mutual military support.
- The bill covers three main kinds of activity. These are China-to-Russia military goods or services, weapons or training for Russian users, and Russian support that improves China’s military ability to operate in the Taiwan Strait.
- Sanctioned targets would have their covered property frozen. This applies to property in the United States or controlled by U.S. persons, using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a law for national-security economic sanctions.
- Sanctioned foreign individuals could not get U.S. visas, admission, or parole. The U.S. would also have to cancel any current visas or entry documents they hold.
- The President must issue the rules, licenses, and orders needed to run the sanctions. People who violate them would face existing penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
- The bill protects U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement work. It also allows entries needed for U.S. duties under the United Nations Headquarters Agreement and consular treaties.
- The President could not use this sanctions power to ban imports of goods as goods. The bill defines goods broadly, but it does not include technical data.
- The President may waive sanctions on a person for up to 90 days at a time. The President must decide the waiver serves the national interest and report it to the proper committees in Congress.
- Sanctions on a person can end if the person stops the targeted activity or takes verifiable steps to stop. The person must also give reliable promises not to do it again, and Congress must be notified.
- The sanctions power would not last forever. The whole sanctions section and sanctions imposed under it would end seven years after the bill becomes law.
Impact
Why it matters—and who it affects
Why it matters
This bill focuses on how China and Russia support each other’s military power, especially Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and China’s potential operations in the Taiwan Strait. By requiring sanctions on people and entities that help this type of cooperation, it aims to change the costs and risks of doing this work. The bill would affect foreign defense companies, suppliers, and middlemen that move weapons, dual‑use goods, and training between China and Russia. For the United States, the bill would further tie national security policy to economic and financial tools, such as blocking access to U.S. property and the U.S. financial system. It would also formalize regular planning with allies and partners on sanctions and export controls, which could influence how international businesses handle trade with Chinese and Russian defense‑related entities. The exact impact on military activities, the war in Ukraine, and tensions around Taiwan is not specified and would depend on how the executive branch implements the sanctions and how other countries respond. The seven‑year sunset means these authorities are time‑limited unless Congress acts again. This could shape longer‑term planning by the U.S. government, allies, and affected industries, while also allowing for future review and adjustment based on results and changing security conditions.
Who it affects
This bill mainly affects Chinese and Russian defense-linked people, companies, suppliers, and middlemen that help the two countries’ militaries. It could also affect companies in other countries if China- or Russia-linked people control them. U.S. banks, businesses, and government agencies would need to follow the sanctions rules. Allies and partner governments would be part of the coordination plan.
The debate
The case for it—and the concerns
These are the main arguments surrounding the bill, not Modern Action’s position.
Arguments in support
- May reduce the flow of critical technology, weapons, and training that help Russia’s military operations in Ukraine by raising legal and financial risks for Chinese and Russian entities.
- Could signal a clear U.S. response to mutual military support between China and Russia, which some see as a challenge to regional stability in Europe and the Indo‑Pacific.
- Uses targeted sanctions and visa limits instead of broad trade bans, aiming pressure at specific actors rather than entire populations or all commerce.
- By requiring a strategy and regular reporting with allies and partners, it may improve coordination of sanctions and export controls across major economies, reducing gaps and evasion.
- The seven‑year sunset and waiver provisions give flexibility for future adjustments as security conditions and diplomatic efforts change.
- Explicit carve‑outs for intelligence, law enforcement, and treaty obligations seek to protect key U.S. operations and international commitments while still allowing sanctions pressure.
Concerns and tradeoffs
- Expanding sanctions on Chinese and Russian entities could further strain U.S. relations with those countries and complicate cooperation on unrelated global issues.
- Businesses and financial institutions may find compliance complex and costly, especially in tracking ownership and control by PRC or Russian Federation persons and the specific activities covered.
- Even with an import exception, affected supply chains and global markets could face uncertainty if companies avoid transactions out of caution.
- Some may question whether sanctions will meaningfully change Chinese or Russian military behavior, given past examples where sanctioned states adapted or turned to alternative partners.
- The focus on activities linked to potential operations in the Taiwan Strait could be seen by some as escalating tensions in that region.
- Regular reporting and strategy requirements may increase administrative burdens on the State and Treasury Departments without a clear measure of effectiveness specified in the bill text.
- Sanctions can apply not only to direct PRC or Russian federal entities but also to any foreign person "under the control" of PRC or Russian Federation persons, potentially sweeping in third‑country companies with such ownership or control.
- The bill explicitly bars using this authority to sanction importation of goods, but technical data and some services remain sanctionable, which could still affect technology transfers and support services.
Check the details
Key facts
- Requires the President, starting 90 days after enactment, to impose sanctions on certain PRC and Russian Federation persons, and those they control, involved in specific types of mutual military support.
- Covers three main sanctionable activities: provision of listed military‑related goods and services from China to Russia’s armed forces or defense industry; procurement or facilitation of weapons, systems, parts, or training for Russian users; and procurement from Russia that enhances the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities for operations in the Taiwan Strait.
- Mandates blocking (freezing) of all property and property interests of sanctioned persons that are in the U.S. or under control of U.S. persons, using authorities in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
- Makes sanctioned foreign individuals ineligible for U.S. visas, admission, or parole and requires revocation of any existing visas or entry documents.
- Directs the President to issue regulations, licenses, and orders needed to implement the sanctions and applies existing IEEPA penalties to violations.
- Exempts U.S. intelligence and law‑enforcement activities, and entries required to meet U.S. obligations under the U.N. Headquarters Agreement and consular treaties.
- Explicitly states that the sanctions authority does not extend to banning importation of goods as such, defining "goods" broadly but excluding technical data.
- Allows the President to waive sanctions on a given person for renewable periods of up to 90 days when judged to be in the national interest and reported to the appropriate congressional committees.
Legislative record
How far the bill has moved
Awaiting Senate floor consideration
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 241. · Oct 30, 2025
- Introduced
- Senate Committee
- 3Senate Floor Vote
- 4Passed Senate
- 5House Review
- 6Passed Both Chambers
- 7Signed into Law
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