Enhanced Iran Sanctions Act of 2025

The bill orders the U.S. President to impose sanctions on foreign people and entities, such as banks, shipping registries, insurance companies, and gas pipeline facilities, that knowingly take part in processing, exporting, or selling oil, gas, liquefied natural gas, or petrochemical products coming in whole or in part from Iran. It also covers subsidiaries, successor companies, and those owned or controlled (50 percent or more) by already sanctioned persons, as well as corporate officers and certain immediate family members of those involved. The main sanctions are freezing any property or interests in property that these persons have in the United States or that come under the control of a U.S. person, and blocking almost all transactions with them. In addition, targeted foreign individuals become ineligible for U.S. visas and admission, and any existing visas are revoked, with narrow exceptions when the United States must honor international agreements (such as for the United Nations) or support law enforcement. The bill states that it does not require sanctions on the import of “goods” into the United States as such, defining that term broadly for physical items. It allows the President to waive sanctions for specific foreign persons, for up to 180 days at a time (renewable up to a total of two years), if this is certified as vital to U.S. national interests and explained in detail to certain congressional committees. The authority to issue new waivers under this bill ends on February 1, 2029. To improve enforcement, the bill directs the Secretary of State to create an “Interagency Working Group on Iranian Sanctions” within 180 days, made up of representatives from the State Department, Treasury, Justice, and other agencies as needed. This working group is encouraged to build a multilateral contact group with like‑minded countries to share information on sanctions rules, new designated entities, and sanctions evasion methods, and to coordinate new measures on Iran’s uranium enrichment, missile production, and support for terrorism. The bill also amends existing law to add rewards or incentives for private sector reporting: it adds to the State Department’s rewards authority the identification of persons described in this bill, including those trying to evade sanctions using proceeds from intercepted Iranian oil, gas, LNG, petrochemicals, or related products. It further clarifies that one ownership‑control provision should be interpreted consistent with prior guidance from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

This bill aims to reduce the money Iran can earn from selling energy products like oil, gas, and petrochemicals through international markets. By targeting the wider logistical chain—such as shippers, financiers, insurers, and related companies—it seeks to make it harder for Iran to move these products and to use complex networks to avoid existing sanctions. For foreign banks, shipping companies, insurers, and trading firms, this could affect decisions about doing business linked to Iranian energy, because they could face U.S. asset freezes and loss of access to U.S. visas. The bill may also influence how other countries enforce their own sanctions or controls on Iran, since it encourages information sharing and joint action through an international contact group. The effect on global energy markets, prices, or specific countries’ energy supplies is not specified in the bill and would depend on how widely the sanctions are enforced and how companies and governments respond. For U.S. policy, the bill is part of a broader approach to address concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, missile programs, and support for groups the U.S. designates as terrorist organizations, by using economic and financial pressure tools.

• Requires the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons, including banks, insurers, shipping registries, and LNG pipeline facilities, that knowingly take part in the processing, export, or sale of oil, gas, LNG, or petrochemicals from Iran.
• Extends sanctions to subsidiaries, successors, aliases, and entities that are 50% or more owned or controlled by already sanctioned persons, as well as certain corporate officers and immediate family members.
• Mandates blocking (freezing) of targeted persons’ property and interests in property that are in, or come within, the United States or under the control of a U.S. person.
• Makes sanctioned foreign individuals ineligible for U.S. visas, admission, or parole, and requires revocation of existing visas, with narrow exceptions tied to U.N. Headquarters obligations and U.S. law enforcement needs.
• Explicitly states that the sanctions requirement does not extend to imposing sanctions on the importation of goods into the United States, as defined in the bill.
• Authorizes the President to waive sanctions on a case‑by‑case basis for up to 180 days (renewable in 180‑day increments up to a total of 2 years per person), if certified as vital to U.S. national interests and reported with justification to specified congressional committees.
• Ends the authority to issue new waivers under this bill on February 1, 2029.
• Directs the Secretary of State to establish, within 180 days of enactment, an Interagency Working Group on Iranian Sanctions including State, Treasury, Justice, and other agencies.
• Instructs the Working Group to seek creation of a multilateral contact group with like‑minded nations to share sanctions information, track newly designated entities, identify enforcement gaps, and coordinate new measures on Iranian nuclear and missile activities and support for terrorism.
• Expands the State Department’s rewards authority to cover tips identifying persons engaged in sanctionable activities or evasion under this Act, including those using proceeds from intercepted Iranian oil, gas, LNG, and petrochemical sales.
• Allows use of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorities for implementation and applies IEEPA’s civil and criminal penalties to violations of the property‑blocking sanctions.
• Specifies that a key ownership/control provision must be interpreted consistent with existing Treasury (OFAC) guidance in certain published FAQs.

• Immediate family members of sanctioned foreign persons can themselves become subject to sanctions, even if the bill does not spell out a required level of involvement in the underlying activities.
• The bill explicitly carves out the importation of goods into the United States from the sanctions requirement, which may limit some trade impacts compared with broader embargo‑style measures.
• The waiver authority sunset date (February 1, 2029) applies to issuing new waivers, but waivers granted before that date may still run for their authorized periods, potentially extending the bill’s practical effects beyond that date.
• The bill ties interpretation of certain ownership/control sanctions to existing OFAC FAQs, meaning changes to those FAQs or their successors could subtly change how the law is applied without amending the statute itself.