Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act of 2026

Title I changes how surveillance under FISA works. It generally bans U.S. officials from searching Section 702 databases to look for the communications or information of U.S. persons unless they have a warrant, an existing court order, clear emergency, consent, or are using narrow cybersecurity threat signatures. It defines what a “query” and a “covered query” are, bars using metadata-only searches as a back door to review full communications, and says these rules also apply when Section 702 data is mixed into larger datasets. It also adds reporting and annual compliance reviews, and limits how emergency query results can be used. The bill rolls back some recent expansions of who counts as an “electronic communication service provider” for FISA purposes after December 31, 2026, and temporarily limits which kinds of newer service providers can be compelled to assist under certain directives. It requires the intelligence community to review and possibly declassify information about what types of providers were at issue in specific FISA court opinions, and sets notice, review, and reporting rules for directives involving those providers. It expands the use of outside “amicus curiae” lawyers in the FISA Court, gives them greater access to case materials and classified opinions, and lets them seek higher-court review of important legal questions. It also extends FISA Title VII authorities, including Section 702, until April 20, 2028. Title II focuses on records held by data brokers and online services. It bars law enforcement and intelligence agencies from paying third parties for certain personal records about U.S. persons—such as communications records, contents, and location data—or for information that was obtained in deceptive or contract-breaking ways. It also bars other government agencies from passing such purchased data to law enforcement or intelligence, and makes illegally obtained data and any evidence derived from it unusable in court and other proceedings. The bill directs the Attorney General to set procedures to minimize keeping or sharing such improperly obtained information. The bill updates federal electronic privacy law so that, when the government seeks certain records from third parties instead of directly from a communications or cloud provider, it must meet the same—and the most protective—legal standard that would apply if it went to the provider. It formally defines “intermediary service providers” that carry or store data for other providers and bars them from voluntarily turning over customer records or contents except under existing legal rules. It broadens “online service provider” so that the same warrant and order rules apply to more Internet services, including platforms and some library or school systems. Finally, the bill tightens how foreign intelligence surveillance can be done outside the main FISA framework. It clarifies that other laws do not change FISA’s control over electronic surveillance and interception inside the United States. It states that FISA is the exclusive way to collect communications records, location information, web browsing history, internet search history, and other Fourth Amendment–protected information about U.S. persons or people inside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes from U.S.-based providers. It narrows telecom companies’ civil immunity when they help with emergency wiretaps without a court order, limiting protection to a short period and to cases that meet emergency standards.