Block the Use of Transatlantic Technology in Iranian Made Drones Act

This bill orders the U.S. Department of Commerce to write a strategy to stop illegal exports of certain technologies from the United States to Iran for use in Iranian-made unmanned aircraft systems (drones). The strategy must cover items such as microcontrollers, voltage regulators, digital signal controllers, GPS modules, and microprocessors. Commerce must set up processes to find which current and new technologies Iran uses or might use in drones, identify U.S. companies that make these items, and identify foreign makers and distributors that may be helping Iran get them through middlemen. The Department of Commerce must also create a way to share updated information with U.S. manufacturers about third-party distributors and resellers that try to get around export controls for Iran. Commerce must send this strategy to key committees in Congress within 60 days, mostly in an unclassified report, with the option to include a separate classified annex. The bill also directs the Department of State to develop a similar strategy focused on foreign manufacturers and allied and partner countries. State must set up a process to identify foreign companies that make the same types of technologies and work with U.S. allies and partners to line up their export control rules with U.S. rules for these items. State must send its strategy to the same congressional committees within 90 days, again mostly unclassified but with an optional classified annex. In addition, the bill requires the Secretary of Defense, working with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, to develop a range of options for the U.S. Armed Forces to counter or deny Iran’s ability to get these technologies. This includes options related to microelectronics, computer-aided design (CAD) software, and computer numerical control (CNC) machines. Defense must complete these options within 30 days and brief the relevant congressional committees within 45 days of the bill becoming law. The bill defines which congressional committees are to receive the strategies and briefings and adopts existing legal definitions for “unmanned aircraft” and “unmanned aircraft system.”

This bill is aimed at limiting Iran’s access to key parts and technology used in drones, which are seen as important in several conflicts. It focuses on “dual use” items like microelectronics that are widely sold for civilian uses but can also be used in weapons systems. Because these parts are common in global supply chains, controlling where they end up is complex. For U.S. and foreign technology manufacturers and distributors, the bill could mean more engagement with U.S. government agencies and more attention to export-control rules related to Iran and unmanned aircraft systems. Companies may receive more frequent updates about high-risk customers or distributors. For U.S. allies and partners, the bill encourages closer alignment of export rules, which could affect how they license and monitor sales of certain technologies. For national security and foreign policy, the bill seeks to give the U.S. government and military more tools and options to slow or disrupt Iran’s drone programs and their use by other actors. The exact impact on Iran’s capabilities, global supply chains, or ongoing conflicts is not specified in the bill and would depend on how the strategies and options are designed and carried out in practice.

• Directs the Department of Commerce to develop a strategy to prevent illegal exports from the United States to Iran of technologies used or that may be used in Iranian unmanned aircraft systems, including specific types of microelectronics.
• Requires Commerce to establish processes to identify relevant technologies, U.S. manufacturers, foreign manufacturers, and third-party distributors and resellers that may attempt to evade export controls related to Iran.
• Requires Commerce to set up methods to proactively share updated information about high-risk third-party distributors and resellers with affected U.S. manufacturers.
• Directs the Department of State to develop a strategy to prevent exports of these technologies to Iran from both the United States and allied and partner countries.
• Requires State to work with U.S. allies and partners to align their export control regimes with U.S. export controls for technologies used in Iranian drones.
• Requires submission of the Commerce strategy to designated congressional committees within 60 days of enactment, and the State strategy within 90 days.
• Authorizes both Commerce and State to include classified annexes with their strategies, provided they are separate from the unclassified reports.
• Requires the Department of Defense, in coordination with State and the Director of National Intelligence, to develop within 30 days a range of options for the U.S. Armed Forces to counter or deny Iran’s ability to acquire specified technologies.
• Mandates a Defense briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on these military options within 45 days of enactment.
• Specifies which House and Senate committees are to receive the strategies and briefings, including foreign affairs, armed services, banking and housing (in the Senate), and intelligence committees.

• The Defense section includes not only microelectronics but also software and equipment such as CAD software and CNC machines, which are used in many civilian manufacturing settings.
• The bill does not itself create new sanctions lists or penalties; instead, it requires strategies and options that could later lead to new regulatory or military actions.
• The required reports can include classified annexes, meaning some specific details about technologies, companies, or military options may not be publicly disclosed even though the existence of the strategies is public.
• The definition of “appropriate congressional committees” includes banking and housing in the Senate, reflecting the role of financial and export-control policy even though the bill’s title focuses on drones.