Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025

The bill gives the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis new duties. These include studying and promoting strong and stable supply chains for critical goods and emerging technologies, and helping the government prepare for and respond to supply chain shocks. The Assistant Secretary is told to support U.S. manufacturing of these goods, work with allies and key partner nations, and encourage less reliance on countries that pose certain risks. The bill orders the creation of a Supply Chain Resilience Working Group made up of many federal agencies, such as Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and others. Within a year, the Assistant Secretary, working with this group, must map and model critical supply chains, find gaps and weak points, study the manufacturing workforce, and identify tools and data needed to track risks. They must also work with state and local governments, industry, and allies to find ways to close gaps, plan for crises, and improve response to future shocks. The Assistant Secretary must quickly designate which industries, supply chains, and goods are “critical,” allow for public comment, and update these designations at least every four years. The bill requires an initial implementation report to Congress within one year and then an annual national strategy and review on critical supply chain resiliency and U.S. manufacturing. These reports must describe threats, the capacity of U.S. and allied manufacturing, potential impacts on rural, Tribal, and underserved communities, and a strategy with specific recommendations to strengthen supply chains. The bill protects certain sensitive business information that companies may voluntarily share with the Department of Commerce about their critical supply chains. If properly marked, this information is exempt from Freedom of Information Act release, cannot normally be used in civil lawsuits, and cannot be shared or used for other purposes except in limited cases, such as criminal investigations or oversight by Congress and the Government Accountability Office. The bill makes clear that companies are not required to share information, ask for assistance, or follow recommendations from the Department. The Secretary of Commerce must also produce a report identifying all relevant supply chain and manufacturing innovation activities inside the Department, assess their authority and effectiveness, and recommend ways to coordinate and improve them. The bill does not authorize any new funding, so the Department must carry out these duties using existing resources. All authorities and requirements in the bill end 10 years after enactment.

The bill responds to concerns that shocks such as pandemics, natural disasters, cyber attacks, or geopolitical conflicts can quickly disrupt access to key goods. These goods can include items needed for national security, health, energy, or critical infrastructure, as well as parts and technologies like semiconductors and advanced materials. Having a coordinated federal effort to map and study these supply chains may help decision‑makers understand where the United States is heavily dependent on a small number of sources or on countries that may present risks. For manufacturers, technology companies, and workers, this bill could shape how the federal government supports domestic and allied production of critical goods and emerging technologies. It may influence long‑term planning, workforce needs, and investment decisions, though the bill itself does not create new grants or direct spending. For the public, the bill aims to reduce the chance that major supply disruptions lead to shortages or slowdowns in important services, but the exact real‑world effects will depend on how the Department of Commerce uses its new authorities and how industry and allies choose to respond. The protections for voluntarily shared supply chain information could affect how willing companies are to share detailed data with the government. Strong protections may encourage participation, which could improve the quality of government analysis, but they also limit how that information can be used outside this program. The 10‑year sunset means that Congress will need to revisit the issue in the future if it wants these activities to continue.

• Gives the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis new duties focused on strengthening critical supply chains and emerging technologies.
• Requires creation of a federal Supply Chain Resilience Working Group that includes at least ten named departments and agencies.
• Directs the Assistant Secretary, within 120 days, to designate critical industries, critical supply chains, and critical goods, with a public comment period and updates at least every 4 years.
• Requires, within 1 year, detailed assessments and modeling of critical supply chains, including demand, supply, logistics, workforce needs, and potential shocks.
• Requires an implementation report to Congress within 1 year describing activities, data collected, tools used, and overlapping federal responsibilities.
• Requires an annual national strategy and review on critical supply chain resiliency and U.S. manufacturing, starting no later than 18 months after enactment.
• Instructs the Department of Commerce to identify threats and shocks that could disrupt critical supply chains, including those linked to certain countries specified by cross‑reference to the RANSOMWARE Act.
• Directs development of a strategy to support resilience, diversity, and strength of critical supply chains and emerging technologies, including specific recommendations for long‑term risk reduction and recycling and reuse of critical goods.
• Protects voluntarily submitted, properly marked critical supply chain information from public disclosure under FOIA and limits its use in civil litigation and other government actions, with specific exceptions.
• Clarifies that private entities are not required to share information, request assistance, or implement government recommendations under this program.
• Requires the Secretary of Commerce, within 2 years, to assess internal offices and programs related to critical supply chain resilience and manufacturing innovation and propose coordination and improvement steps.
• States that no new funds are authorized to carry out the bill; activities must use existing appropriations.
• Includes a 10‑year sunset, after which all duties and authorities created by this title end.

• The bill explicitly forbids using voluntarily submitted critical supply chain information in civil actions without the submitter's written consent, even by other government authorities, except in narrow circumstances.
• Communications of protected supply chain information under this program are not treated as advisory committee actions under the federal advisory committee rules, which affects procedural requirements.
• Voluntary submission of information under this bill does not count as meeting separate legal reporting or filing duties a company might have under other laws.
• The protection rules do not apply to semiconductor incentive program applications under a specific existing law, carving out that area from these new confidentiality provisions.
• The term “ally or key international partner nation” is defined to exclude countries that pose significant national or economic security risks and those listed in a separate ransomware‑related statute, tying this bill’s implementation to another law’s designations.
• The bill allows the annual strategy reports to include a classified annex but requires that the main report be unclassified, balancing transparency with protection of sensitive information.
• Emerging technologies are defined to include a detailed list such as AI, quantum computing, robotics, semiconductors, and blockchain, which may shape which sectors are treated as priority areas even if not all are equally vulnerable to supply chain shocks.